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ABSTRACT
This paper takes an historical perspectives approach to the current episode of global imbalances.
I consider four historical episodes which may give some indications as to whether the adjustment
to U.S. current account deficit will lead to a 'benign' or 'gloomy' outlook. The episodes are: the
transfer of capital in the earlier era of globalization the late nineteenth century; the interwar gold
exchange standard; Bretton Woods; and the 1977-79 dollar crisis. I conclude that adjustment in
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Historical Perspectives on Global Imbalances  
1. Introduction 
  Current  concern  over  the  possible  unpleasant  consequences  of  unwinding  the 
global imbalances reflected in a large U.S. current account deficit and comparable current 
account  surpluses  in  East  Asia  has  led to  a  discussion  of  reform  of  the  international 
monetary system. Some have called for a new Bretton Woods system (Uzan 2004) others 
for strengthening the mechanisms of policy coordination developed in the 1980’s (King 
2005). 
  An  historical  approach  may  be  useful  in  putting  matters  in  perspective.  The 
present  international  monetary  regime  of  managed  floating  was  preceded  by  three 
regimes which had different experiences with imbalances and their adjustment. Under the 
classical  gold  standard  with  fixed  exchange  rates,  smooth  adjustment  to  imbalances 
occurred through the price specie flow mechanism and capital flows with a very limited 
role for monetary policy. 
  The interwar gold exchange standard which tried to replicate the performance of 
the  gold  standard  failed  because,  opposite  to  the  gold  standard,  monetary  authorities 
subsumed external balance to domestic considerations and because the U.S. and France, 
key surplus countries, were unwilling to allow the necessary adjustment of rising prices, 
thereby  imposing  the  burden  of  deflation  and  recession  on  the  U.K.,  the  key  deficit 
country. 
  The Bretton Woods system was established in 1944 to overcome the fatal flaws of 
the interwar. Adjustment to imbalances was supposed to be symmetrical between deficit 
and surplus countries with international reserves and IMF assistance to serve as buffers to   3 
international shocks. It broke down because  it evolved into a gold dollar system under 
which the central reserve country did not have to adjust to a growing balance of payments 
deficit and which required the central reserve country, the United States, to follow stable 
monetary policy, which it did until 1965 when it shifted to an inflationary policy; and 
because the Bretton Woods system required capital controls, which as time went by, 
became ineffective (Bordo 1993). 
  The  present  system  of  managed  floating  has  gone  through  several  cycles  of 
perceived misalignment since 1973, which like today, were viewed with alarm. After a 
rocky  start  in  the  1970’s  adjustment  has  been  relatively  smooth  working  primarily 
through  the exchange rate, relative prices and domestic  expenditure. 
  In this paper I first discuss the current set of imbalances, contrasting the views of 
those who consider its resolution as benign with those who expect it to be painful. I then 
give  some  historical  evidence  from  each  of  the  four  regimes  which  may  have  some 
resonance  for  today.  I  consider  the  smooth  adjustment  to  the  massive  international 
transfer of capital in the pre 1914 period and then contrast them to three episodes which 
were less benign: the late 1920’s and early 1930’s; the breakdown of Bretton Woods 
1965 to 1971; and the so called dollar crisis of 1977-79. In conclusion I consider the 
questions: how does today’s experience fit in with the historical patterns and is there a 
valid case for international monetary reform.         
      4 
2. The Current Situation 
The Gloomy view 
  Recent concerns over global imbalances associated with the U.S. current account 
deficit to GDP ratio in excess of 5 % (see figure 1) and U.S. net foreign liabilities of $2.7 
trillion or 25% of GDP (see figure 2) have raised fears of a drastic readjustment involving 
a massive depreciation of the dollar (as large as 90% in some scenarios [Blanchard et al 
2005]) - - it has already fallen about 30% in nominal trade weighted terms against our 
major trading partners (see figure 3) - - with attendant potentially serious effects on the 
U.S. and global economies [ See e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004)]. The adjustment would 
involve reallocation of consumption and production in the U.S. from non traded to traded 
goods, a possible rise in inflation, leading to greater tightening of monetary policy which 
would induce  a recession. The decline in income would reduce both the demand for 
imports  and  domestic  consumption  and  encourage  domestic  saving,  simultaneously 
improving the two faces of imbalance - - the current account and the savings investment 
gap. 
  At the same time the adjustment would have opposite effects in Europe and Japan, 
areas with current account surpluses and excess savings (see figures 4 and 5). To the 
extent that European nominal rigidities prevent it from adjusting to the decline in demand 
for its exports to the U.S., its real economy could suffer. China with its currency pegged 
to the dollar would not have to adjust much and would gain a competitive advantage in 
the U.S. market especially against Europe.    
  In addition, it is argued that to the extent that the imbalances have been financed 
by foreign, especially East Asian central banks accumulation of U.S. treasury bills (up to   5 
65% of their international reserves) that some point will be reached where they will dump 
their  depreciating  dollar  assets  and  shift  their  portfolios  towards  the  euro,  thereby 
aggravating the situation. 
  The  current  situation  is  often  attributed  to  the  IT  boom  of  the  1990’s  which 
induced a massive private capital inflow into U.S. equity markets. The bursting of the 
tech boom (bubble) in 2000 followed by 9/11, a U.S. recession and the Afghanistan and 
Iraq wars led to a shift of the U.S. budget deficit from surplus to a deficit of close to 4% 
of GDP. This twin deficit problem is viewed as a key determinant of the deteriorating 
situation (Frankel 2004).  
 
The Benign View 
  An alternate view does not regard the outlook in such bleak terms. It posits that 
adjustment will be smooth, protracted and benign, very much like what happened in the 
late 1980’s when the U.S. current account deficit recorded a peak of about 4% of GDP. 
This  view  (see  e.g.  Greenspan  2003)  stresses  the  underlying  force  of  financial 
globalization  -  -  a  burgeoning  phenomenon  since  the  1970’s,  which  has  encouraged 
residents  of  open  economies  to  increase  their  holdings  of  foreign  assets  as  a  way  to 
diversify portfolios and smooth out shocks to consumption.  
Global assets and liabilities have mushroomed in the past 3 decades, especially in 
the 1990’s [Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2005)]. Globalization and a decline in home bias - - 
a tendency of domestic investors to prefer domestic assets in their portfolios - - have 
deepened and broadened financial markets around the world and above all in the U.S,   6 
which has seen a disproportionate growth in the demand for its assets because it offers a 
higher real rate of return based on the economy’s long-run good performance.  
Moreover according to Bernanke (2005), the imbalances largely reflect a glut in 
global savings partially reflecting the aging of populations in Japan and some European 
countries but primarily reflecting a reaction by East Asian monetary authorities to the 
effects of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990’s. These central banks prefer to hold 
dollar assets to protect themselves against similar shocks.   
Thus  in  this  view  the  current  account  deficit  and  the  rise  in  U.S.  net  foreign 
liabilities reflect the demand for U.S. instruments by foreigners. Adjustment, to the extent 
it needs occur will be benign because the underlying long-run positive fundamentals will 
continue, and for two additional reasons: valuation effects - - that to the extent dollar 
depreciation is unexpected, it will reduce the value of U.S. foreign liabilities (Gourinchas 
and Rey 2004); and a reduced pass through - - recent empirical evidence shows that only 
a very small fraction of dollar depreciation passes through to higher inflation (Greenspan 
2005).    
 
3. Globalizing Capital Flows and the adjustment mechanism: a benign outcome a 
century ago. 
  A  different  and  perhaps  enlightening  perspective  on  the  issue is  to  delve  into 
economic  history  for  earlier  episodes  of  global  imbalances  which  may  have  some 
resonance for today and which may tell us what is in store for the future. An important 
precedent for the benign outcome view is the previous era of financial globalization from   7 
1870-1914. It was characterized by a rapid global buildup of external assets and liabilities 
and also of long-standing current account imbalances comparable to today’s experience.  
  The fifty years before World War I saw massive net private flows of capital from 
the  core  countries  of  Western  Europe  to  the  countries  of  recent  settlement  overseas 
(mainly the rapidly developing Americas and Australasia), financing railroads and other 
infrastructure as well as budget deficits (especially in the form of bonds but also in the 
form of foreign direct investment). At the peak, the associated current account surpluses 
in Britain reached 9 percent of GDP and were almost as big in France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands  (See  figure  6).  For  the  principal  capital  importers  in  the  late  nineteenth 
century (Argentina, Australia, and Canada), current account deficits exceeded 5 percent 
of GDP on average. Earlier in the century, the U.S. experienced similar flows but by 
century’s end it began to run current account surpluses. 
  In addition data on ratios of stocks of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP for 
selected countries and regions compiled in Obstfeld and Taylor (2003), presents a picture 
of a u – shaped pattern. At its pre 1914 peak the share of foreign assets to world GDP was 
approximately 20%. It declined from that level to a low point of 5% in 1945 with the 
prewar level only being reached by 1985. Since then it has risen to 57% by 1995. A 
similar picture emerges from the ratio of liabilities to overall GDP. 
  The British held the lion’s share of overseas investments in 1914, 50% followed 
by  France  at  22%,  Germany  at  17%,  Netherlands  at  3%  and  the  U.S.  at  6.5%.  This 
compares with the U.S. holding of global assets in 1995 at 25%. These funds in turn 
represented up to one half of the capital stock of one of the major debtors (Argentina) and 
close to one fifth for Australia and Canada.    8 
  A striking feature of the pre 1914 data is the persistence in the current account 
imbalances.  Bordo,  Eichengreen  and  Kim  (1998),  using  the  coefficients  of  an  AR(1) 
regression as well as augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test find evidence of significantly 
greater persistence in both the deficits of the principal capital recipients and the capital 
exporters compared to the recent experience. Similar evidence is seen in variance ratios 
calculated by the authors.  
  Finally the adjustment mechanism to the massive capital transfer worked very 
smoothly.  It  occurred  through  the  price  specie  flow  mechanism  of  the  classical  gold 
standard (Bordo 1984). The transfer of long-term capital from Europe to the New World 
to finance railroads and other infrastructure was also accompanied by gold flows as the 
demand, for example for U.S. railroad bonds by British investors led to a demand for 
dollars hence pushing the dollar to the gold import point. The gold inflows in turn tended 
to raise the price of U.S. exports relative to imports, i.e. to improve the terms of trade, (as 
well as raise the ratio of the prices of traded and non traded goods). It also allowed the 
U.S. to import more goods than otherwise – much of these imports consisting of capital 
goods e.g. rails from Britain. As relative prices adjusted the gold flows would tend to be 
reversed  closing  the  imbalance.  Moreover  short-term  capital  movements  speeded  up 
adjustment as gold flows into the U.S. reduced interest rates relative to Britain.  
  The smooth adjustment to the capital transfers of the pre 1914 era many believe 
reflects the fact that the world was on the gold standard which provided a stable and 
credible nominal anchor. The gold standard also served as a signal of fiscal rectitude (“a 
good housekeeping seal of approval” which assured investors that their debt would be 
repaid and serviced. [Bordo and Rockoff 1996]). Also many of the capital recipients were   9 
part  of  the  British  Empire.  The  latter  established  institutions  and  safeguards  such  as 
giving colonial (Dominion) government debt trustee status in the UK (i.e. having a de 
facto British government guarantee) which virtually eliminated country risk.  
  However the adjustment mechanism in the earlier era of globalization was not 
always benign. Indeed although current account imbalances were more long-lived in the 
pre 1914 era than in the recent period, they were punctuated in some countries by severe 
reversals,  especially  in  the  crisis  ridden  1890’s  (Bordo  and  Eichengreen  1999).  The 
classic financial crisis of the era was the Barings crisis of 1890 which began with a debt 
default in Argentina and spread like wildfire to the rest of the emerging world. Lenders in 
London  and Paris cut off capital  flows to emerging countries like Brazil (Triner and 
Wandschneider  2005)  with  fundamentals  similar  to  those  of  Argentina,  while  other 
countries  deemed  sound  such  as  Canada  were  only  marginally  effected    (Bordo  and 
Murshid 2000). Thus the emerging market crisis problem had historical precedents. Most 
of  the  countries  affected,  those  of  Latin  America  and  Southern  Europe,  lacked  the 
fundamentals i.e. institutions and policies, associated with the more successful recipients.        
  Although the imbalances of the previous age of globalization has considerable 
resonance for today - - especially the fact that both eras were characterized by stable meta 
regimes - - the gold standard then and the adherence by many countries today to credible 
domestic nominal anchors such as inflation targeting and norms for fiscal balance, there 
are  also  considerable  differences.  First,  under  the  gold  standard,  countries  of  new 
settlement—the emerging markets of the time—ran current account deficits while the 
major European economies ran surpluses. In the current era, major economies as well as 
emerging markets can run both persistent deficits or surpluses.    10 
  Second, gross capital flows are much larger today and gross asset and liability 
positions were very close to net positions before 1914, in contrast to today where most 
major  industrial  countries  are  both  major  creditors  and  debtors.  The  earlier  pattern 
reflects the prevalence of long-term investment by the core countries in the countries of 
new settlement. The substantial growth of two-way flows between advanced countries 
since  1980  have  been  associated  with  both  international  financial  diversification  and 
intertemporal consumption smoothing. 
Third, the adjustment mechanism is different. The historical record shows that 
adjustment  to  the  significant  and  persistent  external  imbalances  in  the  pre-1914  era 
occurred largely through the Humean price-specie-flow mechanism of the classical gold 
standard. In contrast, the global economy is now on a managed floating exchange rate 
regime and instead of gold flows, the brunt of the external adjustment occurs through 
changes  in  the  exchange  rate  and  international  reserves,  along  with  relative  price 
movements, short-term capital flows, and valuation effects (Obstfeld, 2004). 
Finally in the pre 1914 era, Great Britain was the dominant country. Its currency 
the pound, served as the international medium of exchange and as a key reserve asset. 
Great  Britain  ran  considerable  current  account  surpluses  throughout  the  period.  By 
contrast, the U.S. is the dominant economy today and the dollar is the key currency. 
However the U.S. has been running persistent current account deficits. 
   11 
4. Further lessons from history: Some Bad Outcomes 
  History also gives three other not so rosy scenarios of global imbalances and how 
they were adjusted too: the interwar gold exchange standard, the Bretton Woods system 
and the 1977-79 dollar crises. 
The Interwar 
  World War I ended the classical gold standard as all of the belligerents except the 
US abandoned gold convertibility. Private capital flows also ceased. After the war, by 
1926, the major countries returned to a variant of the gold standard, the gold exchange 
standard in which members held most of their international reserves in dollars, sterling, 
and francs and the US, Great Britain and France held gold.  
But  the  interwar  gold  standard  had  serious  flaws  which  prevented  smooth 
adjustments to the imbalances that built up (Meltzer 2003, Eichengreen 1992). The key 
problem was that the major countries returned to gold at misaligned real exchange rates. 
All  the  belligerents  had  serious  inflations  during  the  war  and  the  restoration  of  the 
original gold parities involved deflation and recession. As it turned out Britain restored 
parity at $4.86 with an overvalued real exchange rate while France and Germany each 
greatly  devalued  their  currencies  and  restored  parities  at  undervalued  real  levels  (see 
figure 7). The U.S. never left the gold standard but U.S. prices did not return to the 
prewar  level  so  that  its  real  exchange  rate  was  also  undervalued.  This  misalignment 
meant that the U.S., France and Germany tended to run current account surpluses while 
Britain, and its empire and countries economically linked to it, ran deficits. Under the 
gold standard, this meant that gold tended to flow towards the surplus countries. Also 
under the gold standard rules, both creditors and debtors were supposed to adjust to the   12 
imbalances: creditors by allowing domestic price levels to rise; debtors by deflation. As it 
turned  out  both  the  U.S.  and  France  continuously  sterilized  their  gold  flows  and 
prevented  adjustment  (Meltzer  2003).  As  a  consequence  they  imposed  deflationary 
pressure on Britain and on the rest of the world.  
  Another important difference between the classical and interwar gold standards 
that impaired the adjustment mechanism in the latter, was the lack of credibility in the 
member countries’ adherence to gold convertibility. Unlike in the earlier period, markets 
had limited confidence that countries would always put external balance considerations 
before domestic policy concerns (Eichengreen 1992). This meant that short-term capital 
movements could be destabilizing. In the end the system collapsed after 1929 in the face 
of the Great Depression. Speculative attacks against countries that used expansionary 
monetary policy to alleviate banking panics and to stabilize the real economy, forced 
country after country to abandon the gold standard (Eichengreen 1992). This was not the 
case for the U.S. however, it had adequate gold reserves to withstand speculative attacks 
(Bordo, Choudhri and Schwartz 2002).  The U.S. left the gold standard in 1933 as part of 
Roosevelt’s policy package to reflate the U.S. economy (Meltzer 2003).        
 
Bretton Woods 
  Under the post world war II Bretton Woods system, a distant variant of the gold 
standard, the U.S. was the dominant country, with the largest gold reserves (Bordo 1993). 
Under Bretton Woods rules, the U.S. had to peg the dollar to gold at $35.00 per ounce 
and the rest of the world pegged to the dollar. The rest of the world used dollars as   13 
international reserves and the dollar served as the international medium of exchange. The 
U.S. was also supposed to follow stable monetary and fiscal policies.  
During the period 1959-1971, when the system fully operated (most members had 
current account convertibility), the U.S. ran persistent current account and trade surpluses 
and also engaged in considerable foreign investment. The overall balance of payments 
was generally in deficit and the rest of the world absorbed dollar claims (see figure 8). At 
the same time it is argued that the principal continental European countries and Japan 
kept their real exchange rates deliberately undervalued in order to foster export driven 
growth  in  their  economies  (Dooley  et  al  2002).  This  policy  meant  that  they  kept 
accumulating dollars which as did the U.S. and France in the interwar, they sterilized. It 
has been argued that during this period the U.S. acted as financial intermediary to the rest 
of the world, importing short-term capital (dollar claims) and exporting long-term capital 
(McKinnon 1969). 
  From 1961 to 1967, Europe and Japan’s holding of dollar claims convertible into 
gold kept increasing relative to gold holdings in the U.S. suggesting the possibility of a 
run on the dollar (see figure 9). 
  McKinnon (1969), Meltzer (1991) and others have argued that the system could 
have continued for an extended period as a de facto dollar standard. However two factors 
led  to  the  collapse  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system.  First  the  French  resented  the  U.S. 
‘exorbitant privilege’ of not having to adjust to its payments imbalances because it was 
the  principal  reserve  country.  They  wanted  a  return  to  a  pure  gold  standard  and  to 
facilitate this outcome they converted their outstanding dollar claims into gold. Second   14 
the U.S. began following inflationary monetary and fiscal policies beginning in 1965 - - 
to finance the Vietnam War and the Great Society.  
The expansionary policies increased both the U.S. payments deficit and European 
central bank reserves as the U.S. exported its inflation abroad. As a consequence the 
Europeans begin converting their dollar claims into gold, threatening U.S. gold reserves. 
The system collapsed when Richard Nixon closed the gold window in August 1971.  
It has been argued that a reincarnated Bretton Woods system exists today. China, 
possibly India and other countries are seen as deliberately running an undervalued peg 
against the dollar to encourage export driven growth the way Europe and Japan did 40 
years ago (Dooley et al 2002). The central banks of these countries willingly accumulate 
dollar assets consequent upon their current account surpluses. Dooley et al argue that 
such a relationship could persist for as long as a decade to allow China to absorb its 200 
million surplus agricultural workers into the manufacturing sector.  
Others argue that unlike Bretton Woods, the reincarnated system will not last for 
10  years  but  will  collapse  much  sooner  because,  unlike  the  Europeans  in  the  1960’s 
Asian central banks do not have a stable cartel (Eichengreen 2004). Furthermore, in the 
Bretton woods era there were no good substitutes for the dollar as the world’s reserve 
asset (the pound was a reserve asset but it was weak) but today we have the euro. They 
predict the system will collapse quickly.    15 
The U.S. 1977-1979 
  After the Bretton Woods regime finally collapsed in 1973, the major countries of 
the world shifted to managed floating exchange rates. Countries used exchange market 
intervention to both smooth disorderly markets, and as a residual from Bretton Woods, to 
maintain what were perceived to be equilibrium exchange rates. The 1970’s was also the 
decade with the highest peacetime inflation rates in U.S. history. Inflation which began in 
the mid 60’s, did not abate. A similar pattern occurred in most other countries with the 
principal exception of Germany and Switzerland. Rising inflation (see Figure 10) was 
fueled by monetary growth (see figure 11). There is considerable debate over the causes 
of  the  Great  Inflation:  explanations  include  a  mistaken  belief  in  the  Phillips  curve 
tradeoff; basing policy on the wrong indicators of monetary policy; and errors in the data 
central bank used.  
Two oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979 were also said to have contributed heavily 
to the upward trend in inflation, although some have argued that the OPEC oil price hikes 
were an endogenous response to prior inflation (Barsky and Kilian 2004). The U.S., the 
U.K., Canada and others used expansionary monetary policy to prevent the shocks from 
reducing output and employment, Germany and Switzerland did not accommodate the oil 
shocks, Japan accommodated the first but not the second. These countries had lower 
inflation than the U.S. ,U.K. and Canada. 
  Between 1975 and 1977, the $/Dm and $/¥ traded in a narrow range (see figure 
12), then in the fall of 1977 the dollar began a rapid depreciation which continued into 
1978. At the same time the U.S. was running ever larger current account deficits while   16 
Germany (also Switzerland) and Japan were running significant surpluses (see figure 13). 
According to Solomon (1982) the imbalances triggered capital flight from the U.S. which 
made things worse. The flight was triggered by concerns over the effectiveness of the 
Carter  administration  and  the  belief  that  the  U.S.  was  following  a  policy  of  “benign 
neglect.” 
  The Europeans blamed the U.S. for encouraging the depreciation of the dollar to 
gain competitive advantage and for destabilizing their economies. The U.S. criticized the 
Europeans and Japan for not dealing with their surpluses. Intervention by the Federal 
Reserve and the Treasury in January 1978 was viewed by Solomon (1982, p. 347) as 
ineffective and beginning in the late spring of 1978, the dollar fell “at a disorderly rate.” 
The Fed then reacted by raising the discount rate to 8% in late September and the Carter 
administration promised to trim the fiscal deficit. The dollar continued to fall. 
  Then in a speech given on October 24, 1978 Carter proposed an anti inflation 
package  with  tighter  monetary  and  fiscal  policy;  voluntary  wage,  price  controls  and 
regulatory  reform  to  improve  competitiveness.  According  to  Solomon,  the  dollar 
strengthened by close to 2% against the DM. Carter’s speech was soon followed by a 
rescue package put together by the Treasury and the Fed. It included : $30 billion to 
defend the dollar via an IMF drawing; increased swap lines and the  issuance of $10 
billion in Carter bonds (U.S. securities denominated in foreign currencies); Treasury gold 
sales; and the Fed raising the discount rate to 9.5% and establishing a supplementary 
reserve requirement of 2% against large time deposits.    17 
  In response to this package the dollar appreciated 7% against the DM and 5% 
against the yen. According to Solomon (1982, p. 350) the package led to the end of belief 
in the ‘benign neglect’ doctrine.  
  In the summer of 1979, the dollar resumed its decline, attributed by Solomon to 
the  trouble  the  Carter  administration  was  having  in  handling  recession,  continued 
inflation, the second oil price shock and the Iran hostage crisis. In July Paul Volcker 
replaced G. William Miller as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. The inflation rate 
kept rising, reaching double digit figures in September 1979. On October 8, Volcker 
announced his famous “ shock” involving a rise in the discount rate to 12%, an increase 
in reserve requirements, and a change in operating procedure away from targeting the 
federal  funds  rate  towards  a  non  borrowed  reserves  aggregate.  Following  that 
announcement the pressure on the dollar eased. 
  Compared to the present period the imbalances of 1977-1979 may seen small, at 
less than 2% of GDP, but the underlying problems were far more serious. They reflected 
bad  monetary  policy  in  the  U.S.  which  created  the  Great  Inflation.  The  depreciating 
dollar just reflected the poor record of inflation and recession and the expectation that 
monetary  policy  would  not  improve.  In  that  sense  the  adjustment  well  reflected  the 
underlying fundamentals.             
5. Conclusion: What will happen? 
  We  have  illustrated  four  historical  episodes  of  external  imbalances  and  their 
adjustment.  The  first  worked  remarkably  well.  Two  ended  in  a  collapse  of  the   18 
international monetary regime. The fourth led to a fundamental change in the monetary 
regime. Which episode is more relevant to today’s environment ?  
My bet is a benign outcome like that of the pre war gold standard era. In today’s 
world the underlying fundamental of  globalization and the basic strength of the U.S. 
economy  which  will  continue  to  underpin  the  dollar  as  a  reserve  asset,  suggest  that 
adjustment to the present set of imbalances will be gradual and when all is said and done 
the experience will be viewed as similar to what happened in the late 1980’s.    
  What is the case for international monetary reform? The interwar and Bretton 
Woods debacles both reflected the collapse of regimes with fundamental flaws and the 
pursuit  of  inappropriate  policies  by  the  major  countries.  The  1970’s  U.S.  experience 
reflected a failure in domestic monetary policy and had little to do with problems in the 
international monetary framework being followed. The reaction to the 1970s experiences 
and to later large swings in the major country’s exchange rates led to a concerted move 
by  the  G-7  countries  towards  policy  coordination  of  which  the  most  well  known 
examples were the Plaza (1985) and Louvre (1987) accords. Subsequent research has 
concluded that these efforts were not very successful. To the extent that the situation 
today is not too dissimilar to the earlier episodes in the 1980’s the case for coordination 
does not seem evident. Moreover calls for a reinvented Bretton Woods System given the 
inherent flaws the last time and its sorry experience if heeded, will no doubt lead to the 
same outcome.     19 
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FIGURE 2: NET INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
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Figure 6: Current Account Balances (Percent of GDP) 
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The Dollar-Pound parity in 1925 was $4.86 and the Dollar-Franc parity in 1927 
was $0.0392. 
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Figure 9: Monetary Gold and Dollar Holdings: the United States and the Rest of the 
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